Question: An asymmetric cryptosystem is one that uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. A Tr…

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act is question: An asymmetric cryptosystem is one that uses the same key for both encryption and decryption. A Tr… used to weld the hood of cars shut to keep engine software safe from mechanics. Will we still have the Freedom to Tinker even in the oldest of technologies? What does it mean that the U.

Will we see liability for insecure software and what does that mean for open source? In this talk, Granick will look forward at the forces that are shaping and will determine the next 20 years in the lifecycle of the revolutionary communications technology that we’ve had such high hopes for. It outlines techniques and steps an attacker must take to attack these mitigations to gain code execution on use-after-free vulnerabilities where possible. With increased scrutiny from anti-virus and ‘next-gen’ host endpoints, advanced red teams and attackers already know that the introduction of binaries into a high-security environment is subject to increased scrutiny. WMI enables an attacker practicing a minimalist methodology to blend into their target environment without dropping a single utility to disk. This talk will introduce WMI and demonstrate its offensive uses.

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We will cover what WMI is, how attackers are currently using it in the wild, how to build a full-featured backdoor, and how to detect and prevent these attacks from occurring. Abusing XSLT for Practical Attacks Over the years, XML has been a rich target for attackers due to flaws in its design as well as implementations. XSLT can be leveraged to affect the integrity of arithmetic operations, lead to code logic failure, or cause random values to use the same initialization vector. This presentation includes proof-of-concept attacks demonstrating XSLTs potential to affect production systems, along with recommendations for safe development. One of the most effective countermeasures is to implement parts or all of their proprietary algorithms in hardware. To analyze proprietary hardware implementations additional analysis techniques are necessary.

It is no longer sufficient to follow individual signals on the chip. Instead, full extraction and analysis of the device’s netlist is necessary. This talk will focus on a case study of a widely-used pay TV smartcard. The card includes extensive custom hardware functions and has yet to be compromised after over 5 years in the field. This talk will demonstrate the tools and techniques necessary for successfully performing the analysis of such a target. The research highlights the capabilities of advanced analysis techniques. Such techniques also make analysis significantly more efficient, reducing the time required for a study from many months to a few weeks.

Adventures in Femtoland: 350 Yuan for Invaluable Fun GSM networks are compromised for over five years. Those who are concerned switched off of 2G. T is preparing to switch off all its 2G networks by the end of 2016. 3G and LTE networks have mandatory cryptographical integrity checks for all communications, mutual authentication both for mobile devices and base station. However, the main problem is that we do not have calypso phones for 3G. We do not have cheap and ready to use devices to fuzz 3G devices over the air. Internet on high speeds, make calls, ect.

Yes, there is already research that allows you to gain control over femtocell. There is also research that allows sniffing calls and messages after gaining control. But all such solutions are not scalable. You are still bound to the telecom provider. You still have to connect to a VPN – to a core network. You have to bypass location binding and so on. Perhaps there is an easier solution?

We will tell the whole story from unboxing to proof-of-concept data intercept and vulnerabilities in UMTS networks with all your favorite acronyms: HNB, SeGW, HMS, RANAP, SCTP, TR-069. Universal Android Rooting is Back In recent months, we focus on bug hunting to achieve root on android devices. And also we are the first one in the world, as far as we are aware, rooting the 64-bit android device by taking advantage of a kernel memory corruption bug. The related kernel exploitation method is unique. In this talk, we will explain the root cause of this UAF bug and also the methods used to exploit it.

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We will demonstrate how we can fill the kernel memory once occupied by the vulnerable freed kernel object with fully user-controlled data by spraying and finally achieved arbitrarily code execution in kernel mode to gain root. All our spraying methods and exploiting ways apply to the latest Android kernel, and we also bypass all the modern kernel mitigations on Android device like PXN and so on. Android Security State of the Union The world of security is riddled with assumptions and guesses. Using data collected from hundreds of millions of Android devices, we’ll establish a baseline for the major factors driving security in the Android ecosystem. API Deobfuscator: Resolving Obfuscated API Functions in Modern Packers Modern packers use API obfuscation techniques to obstruct malware sandboxes and reverse engineers.

For dynamic obfuscation, I suggest memory access analysis. Previous approaches use pattern matching of the obfuscating code or code optimization on instruction trace. Pattern matching and code optimization based approaches are fragile to pattern change along the version up of the packers. My approach utilizes the API function obfuscation process which is harder to change than obfuscation pattern.

For static obfuscation, I suggest iterative run-until-API method. Previous approaches used code emulators to identify obfuscated API calls. But most code emulators are not appropriate for deobfuscation because they are developed for emulating the whole operating system. Developing own emulators is time consuming because it requires implementing complex runtime behavior, such as exception based branches and multi-threads that modern packers use. 64 packed binaries can be deobfuscated.

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We can analyze the deobfuscated binary with common reversing tools, such as x64dbg, Ollydbg and IDA Pro. To enable further hypervisor security testing, we will also be releasing new modules in the open source CHIPSEC framework to test issues in hypervisors when virtualizing hardware. However, the previous work usually focus on the vulnerability or malware but the internals of OLE are never examined. This paper intends to fill this gap. The another important part of this research is to explore the attack surface it exposes on Windows, and to explain how an attacker may possibly leverage OLE vulnerability to perform document-based exploitation. These areas are never being looked at from a security point of view.

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Attacking Your Trusted Core: Exploiting Trustzone on Android For years fingerprint scanning has been supported in many Android devices. TEE runs in a special CPU mode called secure mode, so memory for secure mode and security functions can be hidden to the normal world. In this way, Android vendors can provide many secure features such as fingerprint scanning, DRM, kernel protection, secure boot, and so on. The Huawei Hisilicon Kirin 925 processor is the new chip being used on the Huawei Ascend Mate 7, and Hisilicon implemented its own TEE software. There are few documents about it.

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I found some vulnerabilities both in a normal Android world and the secure world while analyzing Hisilicon’s TEE OS. In this talk, I’ll show how to analyze the TEE architecture of Huawei Hisilicon and find some new vulnerabilities in such an undocumented black hole. I exploited two bugs, one for rooting Androids normal world and disabling the newest SE for Android, the other for running shellcode in secure world. With these exploits, we can get the fingerprint image or bypass some other security features.

Automated Human Vulnerability Scanning with AVA It will not be a surprise to you that of all the elements within our organisations and systems, the people are most likely to expose us to risk. Many very clever people have spent a long time teaching us this. So if this is the case, why in 20 years of modern information security have we done so little to actively protect them? Technical vulnerability scanning is now mature and commoditised, allowing us to repeatably test and adapt our systems in the face of a changing threat landscape. The time has come to apply the same logic to our people, actively understand human connectivity and behaviours when faced with threat and understand the effect of this behaviour with our organisations. This talk will discuss why this is a difficult challenge and introduce AVA, the first automated human vulnerability scanner that allows us to map the connectivity of our people, test them with a range of security threats and measure their behaviour.

Let’s change the way we approach human security risk. Hypervisor to hook and intercept execution of the true NT kernel. Because VTLs are all more privileged than Ring 0, this now creates a model where a user-mode application running inside a VSM now has data and rights that even the kernel itself cannot modify. Why go through all this trouble? How “secure” is this new model really? And what prevents a malicious application from running in such a secure mode to begin with?

This is an insider’s look at how agencies exploit their power by bullying the small and weak to control the private sector. House Oversight investigation, a stinging Congressional report about the FTC’s behavior, and criminal immunity from the Justice Department for a whistleblower. Because of his work, Mike has testified before the House of Representatives House Oversight Committee and regularly keynotes in front of healthcare, law, business and technology audiences educating them on what to expect when the Federal Government investigates you. BGP Stream BGP is the fabric of routing on the Internet today. There are approximately half a million routes on the Internet originated by about 50,000 unique Autonomous Systems.

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BGPmon has been operating a network of BGP probes, classifiers, and associated alerts on these changes and has discovered and publicized several attacks that utilize BGP. Today, we are announcing BGP Stream. By subscribing to the stream one can monitor and alert potentially damaging network changes that affect traffic flows. This talk will cover the idiosyncrasies of nation-state malware research using the experiences of presenters in the ‘Threat Analyst Sweatshop. We will focus on the attribution problem and present a novel approach on creating credible links between binaries originating from the same group of authors.

Our goal is to add to transparency in attribution and supply analysts with a tool to emphasize or deny vendor statements. Breaking Access Controls with BLEKey RFID access controls are broken. In this talk, we will demonstrate how to break into buildings using open-source hardware we are releasing. Over the years, we have seen research pointing to deficiencies in every aspect of access control systems: the cards, the readers, and the backend. Yet, despite these revelations, there has been no meaningful change in their design or reduction in use around the world.

Do these companies not care about physical security, or do they not understand the implications of these weaknesses? We have improved upon previous research with an open-source hardware device that exploits the communication protocol used by the majority of access control systems today. Our goal is to use this device to help those relying on insecure devices understand the risks. We will also explain what can be done to lower the risk of access control attacks. Breaking Honeypots for Fun and Profit We will detect, bypass, and abuse honeypot technologies and solutions, turning them against the defender.

The concept of a honeypot is strong, but the way honeypots are implemented is inherently weak, enabling an attacker to easily detect and bypass them, as well as make use of them for his own purposes. Our methods are analyzing the network protocol completeness and operating system software implementation completeness, and vulnerable code. As a case study, we will concentrate on platforms deployed in real organizational networks, mapping them globally, and demonstrating how it is possible to both bypass and use these honeypots to the attacker’s advantage. However, people are used to believe that BGP hijacking is not a huge issue.

Yes, a denial of service can happen, and some plaintext data may be disclosed to an attacker, but there’s nothing more to it, since all sensitive data transmitted over the Internet should be encrypted already, and a man in the middle of the Internet cannot decrypt it or break into encrypted connection. So there’s pretty much nothing to really worry about. TLS PKI, which itself trusts Internet routing. Now there’s a way to exploit this trust, and we are going to show how, and to discuss how to prevent this from happening. They were largely relegated to researchers and tinkerers on the fringes. Well deployed honeypots can be invaluable tools in the defenders arsenal, and don’t need to look anything like the honeypots of old.

From application layer man-traps, to booby-trapped documents. From network-level deception, to cloud based honeypottery, we are bringing honeypots back! During this talk, we will discuss and demonstrate the current state of the art regarding honeypots. Over the past few years, honeypots have gotten a bit of a bad rap. We will give you tools, techniques and takeaways, to move them from geeky time-wasters, to the most useful pieces of kit you will deploy.

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This talk aims to examine Chinas destructive new toy and its methods for turning both Chinese users and global visitors to Chinese sites into the worlds largest botnet. Although the GC was wielded with all the subtlety of a sledgehammer during its debut, it is certainly capable of being a much more devious and dangerous tool to suppress perceived threats in a targeted and hard-to-detect fashion. Needless to say, it won’t be going away anytime soon. Bulletproof yourself by attending this talk and learning all about Chinas Great Cannon. 1 Update 3 and Windows 10 technical preview.

This talk analyses the weak-point of CFG and presents a new technique that can be used to bypass CFG comprehensively and make the prevented exploit techniques exploitable again. Furthermore, this technique is based on a generic capability, thus more exploit techniques can be developed from that capability. Imagine – a Facebook worm giving an attacker full access to your bank account completely unbeknownst to you, until seven Bentleys, plane tickets for a herd of llamas, a mink coat once owned by P. Diddy, and a single monster cable all show up on your next statement.

But in all seriousness, thousands of websites relying on the most popular CDNs are at risk. While some application requirements may need a security bypass in order to work, these intentional bypasses can become a valuable link in an exploit chain. Our research has unveiled a collection of general attack patterns that can be used against the infrastructure that supports high availability websites. This is a story of exploit development with fascinating consequences. These vulnerabilities allow an attacker to take advantage of unsecure apps certified by OEMs and carriers to gain unfettered access to any device, including screen scraping, key logging, private information exfiltration, back door app installation, and more. 4G SIM cards from a variety of operators and manufacturers.

Commercial Mobile Spyware – Detecting the Undetectable Research shows commercial spyware is becoming common place. Heavy utilization of GPUs has increased the power of these tools exponentially. Many organizations and individuals have built massive GPU password cracking rigs and cloud based services, such as AWS GPU instances, have also placed high performance cracking into the realm of affordability. Although the current tools do an amazing job providing heavy utilization for individual hardware, they have not kept pace with the need for distributed cracking services. The Resource is a service that runs on individual systems, providing access to their underlying hardware. This talk answers these questions by taking you through how NFC payments work and how you can perform fraudulent transactions with just an off-the-shelf phone and a little bit of software. Information will be provided on the inexpensive tools now available for testing NFC devices and how to put together your own testing lab to test for vulnerabilities over these interfaces.

This presentation will explore the inner workings of what is, without a doubt, one of the most hostile network environments ever created. We just try to keep it up and running. So come see what goes into the planning, deployment, and maintenance of the Black Hat network infrastructure. We’ll share as much as we can about the history of the network, the gear we’re using today, and the traffic patterns that keep us sweating, and laughing, well into the night.